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Abstract
We study the equilibrium solutions of three player Kuhn poker with N > 3 cards.
We compute these solutions as a function of the initial pot size, P , using a novel
method based on regularizing the system of polynomial equations and inequalities
that defines the solutions, and solving the resulting system of nonlinear, algebraic
equations using a combination of Newton’s method and arc-length continuation. We
find that the structure of the equilibrium solution curve is very complex, even for
games with a small number of cards. Standard three player Kuhn poker, which is
played with N = 4 cards, is qualitatively different from the game with N > 4 cards
because of the simplicity of the structure of the value betting and bluffing ranges of
each player. When N > 5, we find that there is a new type of equilibrium bet with
midrange cards that acts as a bluff against one player and a value bet against the
other.
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1 Introduction
The computation of Nash equilibria in multiplayer games is a central problem in com-
putational game theory (see, for example, [9] and the papers described therein). Many
algorithms exist, with different strengths and weaknesses, suitable for a variety of differ-
ent forms of game (for example, see the software package Gambit, [5]). In this paper, we
study a simple class of toy poker games - three player Kuhn poker with N > 3 cards and
pot size P - and focus on computing the equilibrium solutions as N and P vary. The
structure of the system of polynomial equations and inequalities that determines the
equilibrium solutions is very simple, and we have developed an algorithm that exploits
this.
Three player Kuhn poker has previously been studied withN = 4 and P = 3, which is
one of the simplest multiplayer toy poker games that can be used to test the performance
of equilibrium finding algorithms and more general game playing agents [7, 8]. We show
in this paper that the structure of the equilibrium solution curve as a function of P is
complex, and that for N = 4 the initial pot size P = 3 is a special case for which a range
of equilibrium solutions is possible. We also find that increasing N to five and beyond
leads to a significant increase in the complexity of the equilibrium solution curve.
It is worth making some comments about the philosophy behind our investigation.
We believe that toy poker games such as those examined in this paper are interesting in
their own right. They are mathematical objects of surprising complexity, given their sim-
ple definition. There is also value in studying and understanding the simplest nontrivial
multiplayer games as a basis for understanding more complex multiplayer games with
greater significance to the real world. In addition, poker (Texas Holdem in particular)
is one of the world’s most popular games, and is often cited as a challenge problem in
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game theory and computer science (for example, [3]). Although an equilibrium solution
of two player, limit Texas Holdem has recently been computed, [4], and an AI based
on a combination of equilibrium finding and neural network evaluation performs at a
superhuman level in two player, no limit Texas Holdem, [6], the multiplayer versions of
these games have not been studied in as much detail, [7].
In Section 2, we describe the class of game, three player Kuhn poker with N >
3 cards, that we will study in this paper (most easily understood with reference to
the decision tree shown in Figure 1), and formulate the mathematical problem that
determines the equilibrium solutions. We also note the dominated strategies that can be
eliminated, and determine the smallest pot size for which a nontrivial solution exists. In
Section 3, we introduce a regularized version of the equilibrium equations, and describe
our implementation of the arc-length continuation method that we use to solve it. After
verifying our method on a related game that has an analytical solution, namely simplified
Kuhn poker (SKP, [1]), the results of which are discussed in Section 4, we move on to
study numerical solutions of the full problem for various N > 3 in Section 5. We discuss
our results further and indicate some extensions of this work that we will pursue in the
future in Section 6.
2 Three player Kuhn poker with N > 3 cards
In the version of three player Kuhn poker that we study in this paper, the deck contains
N > 3 different cards numbered from 1 to N . A single card from the deck is dealt at
random to each player without replacement. The pot contains P units (each player is
assumed to have contributed P/3 units to the pot). The possible betting sequences are
shown in Figure 1. The first action is made by Player 1, who can either bet one unit
or check. The next action is made by Player 2, who can either call the bet of one unit
or fold after Player 1 bets, and either check or bet one unit after Player 1 checks. The
action then moves to Player 3, and continues in the same manner. The game ends after
either three checks or after all players have either bet, called or folded. If two players
fold, the remaining player wins the pot of P units. If two or three players do not fold,
the remaining player who holds the card with the largest numerical value wins the pot
of P units along with any bets or calls made by themselves and the other players.
In this game, each player can choose between exactly two options (bet or check, call
or fold) at each decision node at which they act. We denote by xij the frequency at
which an aggressive action (bet or call) is taken by Player i for i = 1, 2, 3 at the four
nodes that they control (see Figure 1) with each of the N possible cards, so that j = 1,
2, . . . 4N . The frequencies at which Player i chooses a passive action (check or fold) are
therefore 1 − xij . We will also use the notation xij = xl with l = 4N(i − 1) + j = 1, 2,
. . . 12N whenever convenient for the presentation of our results.
The value of the game to Player k is Ek(xij) for k = 1, 2 or 3. Note that this is a
zero sum game, so E1 +E2 +E3 = 0. An analytical expression for these three functions
can be calculated, either by hand or using computer algebra, in terms of the frequencies
xij , or calculated numerically from the game tree for a given set of 12N numerical values
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1 Player 1
10
12
Call Fold
Call
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Call Fold
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2 Player 2
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Call Fold
Call
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Call Fold
Fold
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3
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Call Fold
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Bet Check
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Figure 1: The decision tree for three player Kuhn poker. Open circles are decision nodes, numbered from 1 to 12. Solid
circles are terminal nodes. The Player labels given in bold face apply to all nodes on the same horizontal level, i.e. Player 1
acts at nodes 1, 4, 8 and 9, Player 2 acts at nodes 2, 5, 6 and 10, Player 3 acts at nodes 3, 7, 11 and 12.
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of xij . In this paper, we have used computer algebra (specifically, the Symbolic Math
Toolbox in MATLAB) to determine Ek and its derivatives analytically, and will discuss
the limitations of this approach below. Note that each of the polynomial functions Ek
is linear in each of the frequencies xij .
Since Player k seeks to maximise Ek, an equilibrium set of betting frequencies, xij =
xˆij satisfies
∂Ei
∂xij
(xˆij) = 0, or
∂Ei
∂xij
(xˆij) < 0 and xˆij = 0, or
∂Ei
∂xij
(xˆij) > 0 and xˆij = 1 for j = 1, 2, . . . 4N.
(1)
This set of equations and inequalities (which can be rewritten as a variational inequality,
although we will not do so here) takes this simple form because the decision tree has just
two branches at each node. It is (1) that we study in this paper. We seek equilibrium
solutions and wish to determine how they vary with pot size, P .
In [1], we studied simplified Kuhn poker (SKP), in which there are just eleven non-
trivial betting frequencies, and hence eleven conditions in (1). The equilibria of SKP
can be found by using computer algebra to consider each of the 311 = 177147 possible
combinations of conditions in (1). As the number of conditions in (1) increases, analysis
of the equilibrium solutions rapidly becomes intractible using this exhaustive method.
In order to study larger games, such as three player Kuhn poker (N = 4), which has a
system of 48 conditions in its raw state that can be reduced to 23 conditions by elimi-
nating dominated strategies (see [8]), and also the game for N > 4, a numerical method
must be used. We propose a regularized version of (1) that transforms the problem
into a system of nonlinear equations, which can be solved using Newton’s method and
arc-length continuation (see Section 3).
Before proceeding, note that there are some dominated strategies that we can remove.
• A player holding the best card, with value N , will always bet or call at nodes 3 to
12.
• A player holding the worst card, with value 1, will always fold at nodes 4 to 12.
• A player holding the second worst card, with value 2, will always fold at nodes 6,
9 and 12.
This fixes twenty two of the betting frequencies, which leaves 12N − 22 equilibrium
betting frequencies to be determined by (1). When N = 4, it is also straightforward to
show that checking with the second best card, with value 3, dominates betting at nodes
1, 2 and 3. We will not enforce this in the results shown below.
Whatever the value of N , we find that an equilibrium strategy consists of bets with
some high value cards and some low value cards at nodes 1, 2 and 3 (value bets and
bluffs) and calls with some mid to high value cards at the other nodes (bluff catching). In
addition, some fraction of the high value cards is checked at nodes 1 and 2 in order to call
with them at nodes further down the decision tree (sandbagging). It is straightforward
to show that when N = 4, sandbagging and value betting occurs only with the highest
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value card, 4, and bluff catching only with the second highest value card, 3, but that
bluffing may be with either of the two lowest value cards, 1 or 2, depending on the size of
the pot, P . We will see below that, as the number of cards in the deck, N , increases, the
structure of these ranges (value betting, bluffing, sandbagging, bluff catching) becomes
more complex, and the multiplicity of the equilibrium solutions can become as high as
twenty four for some values of P (see Figure 13). We also find that there is a new type
of bet, which acts as a bluff against one player and a value bet against the other, that
obviously cannot exist in two player games.
Finally, we can use a simple argument to determine the smallest value of the pot size,
P , for which any player can make a profit at equilibrium. There are (N−1)(N−2) deals
for which a given player holds the lowest value card and (N−2)(N−3) deals for which a
given player holds the lowest value card and the highest value card is not dealt. Bluffing
with the lowest value card is potentially profitable if the money won when no strongest
card is dealt and every player folds is greater than the money lost when a player with
the strongest card calls, which gives (N−2)(N−3)P > (N−1)(N−2)−(N−2)(N−3),
and hence P > Pmin, where
Pmin ≡
2
N − 3
.
Our numerical results confirm that Pmin is indeed the pot size below which no profit is
possible; more specifically, for all equilibrium solutions with P ≤ Pmin, E1 = E2 = E3 =
0, and with P > Pmin, E3 > 0.
3 The regularized game and numerical method
Consider the system of nonlinear equations
g
(
1
ǫ
∂Ei
∂xij
)
− xij = 0, (2)
where ǫ is a positive regularization parameter and g is a differentiable, monotonically
increasing function that has
1− g(y) ∼ k+/y as y →∞,
g(y) ∼ −k−/y as y → −∞,
(3)
with k± positive constants. This asymptotic behaviour is crucial for our method to work,
for reasons explained in Appendix A. In all of the calculations discussed in this paper,
we have used
g(y) =
1
2
+
1
π
tan−1(y), (4)
which has k± = 1/π (as shown in Figure 2). As ǫ→ 0, (2) asymptotes to (1) in a manner
that we investigate in more detail in Appendix A.
Using the single suffix notation for the solution, it is convenient to rewrite (1) as
fk(x) = 0, or fk(x) < 0 and xk = 0, or fk(x) > 0 and xk = 1, (5)
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Figure 2: The regularization function, g(y) = 1
2
+ 1
pi
tan−1 y, used in this paper, along
with the asymptotic expansions g ∼ −1/πy as y → −∞ and 1− g ∼ 1/πy as y →∞.
and hence the regularized system as
g
(
fk(x)
ǫ
)
− xk = 0, for k = 1, 2 . . . 12N − 22. (6)
In order to solve (6) using Newton’s method and arc-length continuation, we treat the
pot size P as an additional unknown and solve for the vector
X ≡ (x, P ) .
Starting from two initial solutions, X = X0 and X = X1, we solve for a sequence of
solutions Xi, for i = 2, 3 . . ., augmenting the system (6) with the condition
(Xi+1 −Xi) ·
(
Xi −Xi−1
‖Xi −Xi−1‖
)
= δi+1, for i = 1, 2 . . ., (7)
where δi is a sequence of step sizes whose selection we discuss below. Equation (7) en-
sures that the size of the change in the solution vector from the solution at the previous
step, Xi+1 − Xi, projected in the direction tangent to the curve of solutions, is δi+1.
At each step, we solve (6) and (7) using Newton’s method, with an initial guess extrap-
olated quadratically from the previous three solutions. We precalculate the Jacobian
analytically using the Symbolic Math Toolbox in MATLAB.
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By regularizing the problem using the small parameter ǫ, we transform it into a sys-
tem of nonlinear equations. Although solving such systems is, in principle, more straight-
forward than solving systems of variational inequalities, we know that the solution when
ǫ = 0 is not smooth, and expect that regularization will lead to solutions smoothed over
a scale determined by the size of ǫ. This means that, during the arc-length continuation
described above, there will be small regions where the solution changes rapidly. The
sequence of step sizes, δi, must therefore be chosen adaptively to take this into account.
This is done by reducing δi+1 and recomputing if either Newton’s method fails to con-
verge or ‖Xi+1 −Xi‖ is larger than max
{
1.05δi+1, 10
−3ǫ
}
, otherwise slightly increasing
δi+1, but not beyond a maximum value of 0.1. In this manner, the sequence δi adapts
to the contours of the solution curve.
In order to find the initial solutionsX0 andX1, we used the MATLAB solver fsolve,
an implementation of the trust-region dogleg algorithm, to solve (6) with P = 0 and
ǫ = 0.1, taking an initial guess for x drawn at random from a uniform distribution over
[0, 1]. This algorithm is able to find the solution using a poor initial guess in a manner
that is not possible using Newton’s method. We then use parameter continuation to
reduce ǫ to the required value. We find the second initial solution using fsolve with
P = 0.01, taking the solution at P = 0 as the initial guess. From these two initial
solutions, we can proceed with arc-length continuation using Newton’s method.
Finally, for betting frequencies controlled by the same player with the same card
that also lie in the same branch of the decision tree, for example, the betting frequencies
of Player 1 at Nodes 1 and 4, we differentiated with respect to both betting frequencies
in (1). This eliminates some equilibrium solutions that are not perfect in the subgame
associated with the node lower down the tree. For example, if Player 1 always bets with
card 1 at Node 1, x11 = 1. However, the expression for ∂E1/∂x14 associated with the
frequency of betting with card 1 at node 4 has a factor of 1− x11, and is therefore zero
if x11 = 1, since Player 1 never reaches Node 4 with card 1 in this case. The equilibrium
will therefore not necessarily be correct in this case for the subgame at Node 4. By
also differentiating with respect to 1 − x11, i.e. using −∂
2E1/∂x11∂x14, we remove the
factor of 1 − x11, and the equilibrium is then valid in the subgame at node 4. In our
numerical investigation, we found that if we neither removed the dominated strategies
listed earlier, nor performed these extra differentiations, spurious solutions, which use
non-credible threats, could be computed. If either the dominated strategies are removed,
or the extra differentiations are performed, these spurious solutions are eliminated. In
the numerical results discussed below, we both removed the dominated strategies and
performed the extra differentiation, since both steps are well-justified, but using either
alone produces essentially the same results.
4 Test Case: Simplified three player Kuhn poker
In order to illustrate how solutions of the regularized system (2) converge to those of the
original system (1) as ǫ→ 0, and also to verify our method against a known, analytical
solution, we consider SKP, as studied in [1]. In order to do this within the framework of
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Figure 3: The exact expectation of Player 1 in SKP, along with the computed expectation
for various values of ǫ.
three player Kuhn poker with N cards, we set N = 4 and force the betting and calling
frequencies with the card of value 1 to be zero. Note that the cards referred to as A, K,
Q and J in [1] correspond to 4, 3, 2 and 1 in the notation that we use here.
The expectation of Player 1 is shown in Figure 3 for various values of the regular-
ization parameter, ǫ, along with the exact solution. Firstly, we can see that the use
of arc-length continuation has allowed us to compute all of the equilibrium solutions,
including the multiple equilibrium solutions that exist for some ranges of values of the
pot size, P . Secondly, note that this expectation, which is an excellent indicator of the
structure of the equilibrium solutions, showing clearly where multiple equilibrium solu-
tions exist, is accurately reproduced by the regularized system as ǫ → 0. On the main
scale shown, the numerical solution is indistinguishable from the analytical solution for
ǫ < 10−4. If we zoom into a region where the exact expectation is not smooth, we can
see how the numerically-calculated expectation becomes progressively more acccurate as
ǫ decreases. Finally, we can see that at P = 3 and P = 3.5, where we know from the
analytical solution that a range of different expectations is possible, regularization al-
lows the expectations smoothly to connect in a single curve. Figure 4 shows that similar
observations can be made about a typical betting frequency.
Figure 5 shows both the analytical equilibrium betting frequencies c1 and d2, which
correspond to Player 1’s calling frequency at Node 4 and Player 2’s calling frequency at
Node 5 with a card of value 3 (a K), and those determined numerically with ǫ = 10−6.
Also shown are the analytically-determined upper and lower bounds on c1 and d2 for
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Figure 4: The exact equilibrium betting frequency b2, the bluffing frequency of Player 2
with a 2 (Q) at Node 2, in SKP, along with the values computed for various values of ǫ.
the range of values of P for which only c1 + d2 is determined uniquely at equilibrium.
As we can see, the regularized version of the problem selects unique values of c1 and d2
(see Appendix A for more discussion of this).
5 Numerical Results
In this section, we will use the regularized problem with ǫ = 10−6 to investigate the
equilibrium solutions of three player Kuhn poker with N > 3 cards. In each case,
we find a connected branch of equilibrium solutions. We have not attempted to find
solutions not connected to this branch, and, although it seems plausible that no other
solutions exist (this is the case for SKP), we have not attempted to investigate this
further, preferring to focus on the structure of the branch of equilibrium solutions that
we have computed.
We calculated the equilibrium solutions for many different values of N with P as large
as 1000. For example, Figure 6 shows the expectations of each player when there are ten
cards in the deck (N = 10). This is a good way to visualize the solution structure, since
different expectations in this plot must correspond to distinct equilibrium solutions. The
most striking feature is the complexity of this solution curve, with up to fifteen distinct
equilibrium solutions coexisting for some values of the pot size, P . Another surprising
feature is that, for sufficiently large P , Player 2 becomes the biggest loser at equilibrium,
with both E3 and E1 positive. For lower values of P , E3 > E2 > E1, so the later the
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Figure 5: Computed betting frequencies c1 and d2 when ǫ = 10
−6 for SKP. The exact
upper and lower bounds on these frequencies are also shown.
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Figure 6: Computed expectations for N = 10. Note that the scale for the pot size, P , is
logarithmic.
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Figure 7: Computed expectations for N = 4.
player acts (poker players say, the better the position of the player), the greater their
profit at equilibrium. This switch to E2 > E3 for P greater than about 45 is hard to
explain and is a feature that exists when there are five or more cards (but not in standard
three player Kuhn poker, which is played with four cards).
Although the structure of the equilibrium solutions is clearly very complex for larger
values of P , these games have little relevance to poker as played in the real world. Even
with very aggressive betting on each street in games such as limit Texas Holdem, Seven
Card Stud, Razz, Triple Draw and others, the pot to bet ratio, P , rarely reaches double
figures. We therefore concentrate here on interesting features of the equilibrium solutions
of three player Kuhn poker with N > 3 and Pmin ≤ P ≤ 10.
5.1 Three player Kuhn poker (N = 4)
Figure 7 shows the computed expectations for three player Kuhn poker (N = 4). As
we shall see, compared to games with more cards, the equilibrium solution structure is
quite simple; even simpler than the solution structure of SKP, [1]. There are four values
of P , clearly visible in Figure 7, where a range of expectations is possible for two of
the three players, including the case P = 3, which is the usual pot size for three player
Kuhn poker (each player antes one unit before play begins), and which was studied in
[8]. The analytical solutions found in [8] are consistent with the solutions that we have
computed.
Figure 7 does indicate that P = 3 (along with the other three values of P shown)
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is a special case. There is also a small range of values of P for which distinct multiple
equilibrium solutions exist, although they have very similar expectations (almost indis-
tinguishable in Figure 7). These can be seen more clearly close to P = 4.1 in Figure 8,
which shows the equilibrium betting frequencies as a function of P . We can see from
Figure 8 that for P < 3, Players 1 and 2 check all their holdings at equilibrium, and the
game revolves around Player 3 betting and the other players deciding whether to call
with the second best card (Nodes 4, 5, and 6). Note that Nodes 7 to 12 are not reached
at equilibrium for P < 3. As P increases past three, Player 2 starts to bet at a nonzero
frequency (Node 2), and for larger values of P , Player 1 becomes active at Node 1. The
solution structure when N = 4 is relatively simple because there is a clear distinction
between bluffing cards (1 and 2), a single value card (4) and a single calling card (3).
The only tension in the system is between value betting and sandbagging with the best
card (4).
5.2 Three player Kuhn poker with N > 4 cards
Figure 9 shows the equilibrium expectation when N = 5. We can see that the addition
of an extra card significantly increases the complexity of the structure of the solution
curve (compare Figure 9 with Figure 7). There are several ranges of values of P for
which there exist distinct, mutiple equilibrium solutions with a multiplicity of up to
five, as opposed to three for N = 4, and with differences in expected value that are
more striking than those shown in Figure 7. Figure 10 shows the equilibrium betting
frequencies when N = 5. Although there remains a clear distinction between value
betting, bluffing and calling ranges, the behaviour at Node 1 is more complex than when
N = 4, with the value betting frequency of Player 1 with card 5 varying in an irregular
manner for P < 10, perhaps because now each player’s value betting range may include
the best two cards. When N = 4 only the best card is ever value bet at equilibrium.
For N > 5 a new strategy emerges. The players, starting with just Player 1 when
N = 6, can, at equilibrium, make a bet with a mid-value card that is a bluff against
one opponent and a value bet against the other. This happens for a very small range
of values of P when N = 6, so we will illustrate this for a game with more cards in the
deck, N = 13, where this phenomenon can be seen more clearly, as shown in Figure 11.
The case N = 13 is also of interest because this is a game that can be played with a
single suit of a real deck of cards. Figure 11 displays an equilibrium solution in a new
format, for a single value of P . Each bar represents one of the cards, arranged from left
to right with the highest value card at the right. The black part of each bar indicates
the betting frequency at that node with that card. For example, in Figure 11, at Node
2, which is controlled by Player 2, all of the best seven cards are bet with some nonzero
frequency at equilibrium, balanced by some bluffs with the card of value 2. The bars at
some of the subsequent nodes are shortened to indicate that some fraction has been bet
at an earlier node. For example, at Node 5, Player 2 always calls with the three highest
value cards, but the bars are shortened to indicate the fraction of those cards that are
checked at equilibrium at Node 2. The cards with values 5, 6 and 7 do not appear in
this equilibrium strategy at Node 5 since they are always bet by Player 2 at Node 2.
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Figure 8: Computed equilibrium betting frequencies for N = 4.
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Figure 9: Computed expectations for N = 5.
In contrast to this clear bifurcation into value betting and bluffing ranges at Node
2, consider Node 3, controlled by Player 3, and the subsequent Nodes 4 and 5, where
Players 1 and 2 must choose a calling strategy. Player 3 bets the cards of value 5 and 6
at a nonzero frequency at equilibrium, which forms a small but distinct range between
the value betting and bluffing ranges. These bets are for value against Player 1 (Player
1 can call with worse at Node 4, but never folds a better card) and are bluffs against
Player 2 (Player 2 never calls with worse at Nodes 5, but sometimes folds a better card).
These two-way bets are a feature that can have no counterpart in two player games.
Although plots such as Figure 11 work well as a method of displaying a single equi-
librium solution, they do not give any sense of how the equilibrium strategy varies along
the solution curve. A better display method would be a succession of these plots. Since
this would require far too many plots to include here, we have created videos for several
different values of N that illustrate the equilibrium solutions in the format of Figure 11,
with one frame for each solution, moving along the solution curve in equal steps of
arc-length (‖Xi −Xi−1‖), linearly interpolating the numerically-calculated solution to
achieve this. The videos are play at four frames per second by default, and are available
online 1.
Finally, we can illustrate the complexity of the structure of the equilibrium solution
1The link to the videos is https://drive.google.com/open?id=1cv1e-w4VqVd7Q56_Qa9comE01-KzBqol,
where CSV data files can also be found.
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Figure 10: Computed equilibrium betting frequencies for N = 5.
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Node 1, bet/check Node 4, call P3/fold Node 8, call P2/fold Node 9, overcall/fold
0
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0
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Figure 11: One of the computed sets of equilibrium betting frequencies for N = 13 when
P = 9.2. Each bar represents a card, ordered left to right, from lowest value to highest
value. The shaded part of the bar indicates the frequency at which an aggressive action
(betting or calling) is taken at equilibrium, whilst the height of the bar indicates the
fraction of that holding that exists in each players equilibrium range at that node.
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curve by plotting the computed expectations for various values of N . Figure 12 shows
our results for N = 6 to N = 9. The solution curves are hard to distinguish on this scale,
so we have plotted Figure 13, which is a close up in the neighbourhood of P = 8 when
N = 9, showing the expectation of Player 3. In the neighbourhood of P = 7.5 there can
be up to twenty four distinct, coexisting equilibrium solutions. Figure 14 shows the
expectations for some larger values of N . Comparing this to Figure 12 we can see that
each curve has a smaller range of values at each value of P , which suggests that, as N
increases, although there is still a complex solution structure, each equilibrium solution
for a given value of P leads to a similar expectation. In Figure 15 we can see that, if we
zoom in on the expectation for N = 26 (a game that could be played with two suits of
a deck of cards), on this fine scale, the structure of the solution is still complex, despite
the tightening of the range of values of the expectation.
The case N = 26 is the largest game that we are able to compute with the memory
that we have available (about 10Gb of RAM when N = 26) so this method is not
scaleable to even moderately large games. The bottleneck is the use of symbolic algebra
to compute the expectations and their derivatives, which leads to very large MATLAB
function files that use large amounts of memory when evaluated. After these functions
have been computed, however, the method is very efficient. Data files containing the
equilibrium solutions in CSV format are available online, along with the video files
discussed earlier, for a range of values of N .
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we introduced a new method to compute equilibrium solutions of extensive
form, multiplayer toy poker games with no more than two branches at each decision
node. After regularizing the game, we computed equilibrium solutions as a function
of pot size, P , using Newton’s method and arc-length continuation. We used symbolic
algebra in MATLAB to precompute the expectations and their derivatives. This leads
to a numerical bottleneck in memory, as the symbolically computed functions are not
memory efficient, and the largest game that we are able to deal with involves just twenty
six cards. This problem can be overcome by computing the expectations and their
derivatives directly from the game tree (with some loss of computational efficiency).
The polynomial functions that define the expectaions, Ei, are linear in each betting
frequency, so, rounding error notwithstanding, derivatives can be computed accurately
using finite differences since perturbations of unit size lead to exact derivatives. For
this to be done efficiently, we must use a compiled language and an algorithm that
uses the structure of the game tree to minimize computation. This is currently under
investigation.
The numerical method discussed in this paper can be used equally well in the equiv-
alent game with four or more players. We have investigated this using our current
approach, but the memory requirements are very severe, and it is not feasible to com-
pute solutions of even, for example, the four player game with six cards, so we will discuss
these games in a later paper. Another extension to these games that would make them
18
Figure 12: Computed expectations for N = 6, 7, 8 and 9.
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Figure 13: Computed expectation of Player 3 for N = 9.
more relevant to standard limit poker is to allow up to three branches at each node (i.e.
after a bet, a player is able to fold, call or raise). We have developed an extension of our
regularization method that works for games with more than two branches per decision
node, for which the mathematical formulation is more complicated than that given by
(1), but again, we need to avoid using symbolic algebra, and this will form the subject
of a later paper.
It is worth noting that, as discussed in [2], finding the equilibrium solutions of a three
player game is an important first step in understanding the game, but, unlike the case
of two player, zero sum games, simply using an equilibrium strategy (which equilibrium
strategy if more than one exists?) does not guarantee unexploitability. Although the
location of the equilibrium strategies likely indicates the approximate region of parameter
space in which players should choose their strategies, the dynamic interaction of the
players from hand to hand is likely to be chaotic, and dynamic strategies optimal.
Finally, an interesting technical question is whether the large N limit of the games
discussed here maps onto an equivalent [0, 1] game. The equivalent [0, 1] game is obvious
for the half street, two player version of the game: Player 2 has continuous value betting
and bluffing ranges, whilst Player 1 has a continuous calling range. Even for the two
player game however, if there is a full street of betting and Player 1 must split the best
cards into value betting and sandbagging ranges, the mapping to an equivalent [0, 1]
game as N →∞ is not obvious, and merits further investigation.
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Figure 14: Computed expectations for N = 14, 18, 22 and 26.
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Figure 15: Computed expectation of Player 3 for N = 26.
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A Asymptotic solution for 0 < ǫ≪ 1
In order to investigate the limit ǫ → 0 of the regularized problem (2), we construct
the formal asymptotic solution. We order the equations in (5) so that an equilibrium
solution, xk = xˆk, satisfies
xˆk = 0 for 1 ≤ k ≤ k0,
xˆk = 1 for k0 + 1 ≤ k ≤ k0 + k1,
0 < xˆk < 1 for k0 + k1 + 1 ≤ k ≤ 12N .
(8)
There are thus k0 equilibrium betting frequencies equal to zero, k1 equal to one, and
k2 = 12N − k0 − k1 that lie strictly between zero and one. Note that, since (8) is an
equilibrium solution,
fk(xˆ)


< 0 for 1 ≤ k ≤ k0,
> 0 for k0 + 1 ≤ k ≤ k0 + k1,
= 0 for k0 + k1 + 1 ≤ k ≤ 12N .
(9)
We now expand the solution as
xk = xˆk + ǫx¯k, (10)
with x¯k = O(1) as ǫ → 0 and substitute into (6). At leading order as ǫ → 0, we
immediately obtain the solutions
x¯k =
{
−k−/fk(xˆ) for 1 ≤ k ≤ k0,
−k+/fk(xˆ) for k0 + 1 ≤ k ≤ k0 + k1.
(11)
The remaining k2 unknowns, x¯k, satisfy the k2 linear equations
M∑
l=k0+k1+1
fk,l(xˆ)x¯l = g
−1(xˆk)+k−
k0∑
l=1
fk,l(xˆ)
fl(xˆ)
+k+
k0+k1∑
l=k0+1
fk,l(xˆ)
fl(xˆ)
for k0 + k1 + 1 ≤ k ≤ 12N ,
(12)
where fk,l ≡ ∂fk/∂xl, noting that the function g(y) is invertible since it is monotonically
increasing. The asymptotic solution has this simple structure if and only if the function
g(y) satisfies (3), which is why this is a crucial requirement for this regularization method
to be useful.
If the matrix fk,l(xˆ) in (12) is non-singular, this determines x¯l for l = k0 + k1 +
1, . . . , 12N . If fk,l(xˆ) is singular, its nullspace corresponds to components of the equilib-
rium solution that are not uniquely-determined (i.e. they satisfy inequality constraints).
In this case, the solvability condition provides equations that determine the leading or-
der equilibrium solution. Since these equations are nonlinear, there is no obvious way of
showing that they have a unique solution, but this is what we have found in all of our
numerical computations. In other words, the regularization appears to select a unique
equilibrium solution from those available whenever there is an inequality constraint in
the exact solution.
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We can illustrate this analytically using SKP, which has, in the notation of [1],
ordering the unknowns as x = (c2, d3, b1, a1, c3, d1, b2, a2, c1, d2, b3),
f1 = Pb1 − 2a1,
f2 = (P + 1)b1 − 2a1,
f3 = 2P − 4− (P + 1)(c2 + d3),
f4 = c2 + d3 − b3 − (1 +
1
2
c3)b2,
f5 = (P + a1)b2 + (b1 − 2)a2,
f6 = (P + 1)b2 − 2a2,
f7 = 2P − 4 + 2a1 − (P + 1)(c3 + d1),
f8 = c3 + d1 −
1
2
c3b1 − (1 +
1
2
c1)b3,
f9 = (P + a2)b3 + b2 − 2,
f10 = (P + 1)b3 + b1 − 2,
f11 = 2P − 4 + 2a1 + 2a2 − (P + 1)(c1 + d2).
(13)
Solution 1 exists for 2 ≤ P ≤ 3 and is given by
a1 = b1 = a2 = b2 = c1 = 0, b3 =
2
P + 1
, d2 =
2P − 4
P + 1
,
2P − 4
P + 1
≤ c2 + d3 ≤
2
P + 1
,
2P − 4
P + 1
≤ c3 + d1 ≤
2
P + 1
. (14)
Using hats for the leading order equilibrium solution and bars for the correction, from
the first four equations we obtain
P b¯1 − 2a¯1 = g
−1 (cˆ2) ,
(P + 1)b¯1 − 2a¯1 = g
−1
(
dˆ3
)
,
b¯1 = k−
{
(P + 1)(cˆ2 + dˆ3)− (2P − 4)
}−1
,
a¯1 = k−
{
2
P+1
− (cˆ2 + dˆ3)
}−1
.
(15)
The next four equations show that a¯2, b¯2, cˆ3 and dˆ1 also satisfy a system equivalent to
(15). Finally we have
c¯1 =
1
2
k−(P + 1),
(P + 1)b¯3 = −b¯1 + g
−1
(
2P−4
P+1
)
,
(P + 1)d¯2 = 2a¯1 + 2a¯2 − (P + 1)c¯1 − g
−1
(
P
P+1
)
,
(16)
which give c¯1, b¯3 and b¯2 explicitly in terms of the other correction terms. By manipulating
(15), we find that
X = g
(
k−
P
P+1
X − 2P−4
P+1
−
2k−
2
P+1
−X
)
+ g
(
k−
X − 2P−4
P+1
−
2k−
2
P+1
−X
)
≡ F (X), (17)
where X = cˆ2 + dˆ3 = cˆ3 + dˆ1. Since dF/dX < 0 and g is monotonically increasing,
(17) has a unique solution for any k− > 0 and 2 < P < 3 by the Intermediate Value
Theorem.
24
References
[1] John Billingham. Full street simplified three player Kuhn poker, 2017,
arXiv:1707.01392.
[2] John Billingham. Simplified three player Kuhn poker, 2017, arXiv:1704.08124.
[3] Darse Billings, Aaron Davidson, Jonathan Schaeffer, and Duane Szafron. The chal-
lenge of poker. Artif. Intell., 134(1-2):201–240, January 2002.
[4] Michael Bowling, Neil Burch, Michael Johanson, and Oskari Tammelin. Heads-up
limit hold’em poker is solved. Science, 347(6218):145–149, January 2015.
[5] R. D. McKelvey, A. M. McLennan, and T. L. Turocy. Gambit: Software Tools for
Game Theory, version 16.0.1. 2016.
[6] Matej Moravcˇ´ık, Martin Schmid, Neil Burch, Viliam Lisy´, Dustin Morrill, Nolan
Bard, Trevor Davis, Kevin Waugh, Michael Johanson, and Michael Bowling. Deep-
stack: Expert-level artificial intelligence in heads-up no-limit poker. Science, 2017,
http://science.sciencemag.org/content/early/2017/03/01/science.aam6960.full.pdf.
[7] Nick Abou Risk and Duane Szafron. Using counterfactual regret minimization to
create competitive multiplayer poker agents. In Proceedings of the 9th International
Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: Volume 1 - Volume
1, AAMAS ’10, pages 159–166, Richland, SC, 2010. International Foundation for
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems.
[8] Duane Szafron, Richard Gibson, and Nathan Sturtevant. A parameterized family
of equilibrium profiles for three-player Kuhn poker. In Proceedings of the 2013 In-
ternational Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems, AAMAS
’13, pages 247–254, Richland, SC, 2013. International Foundation for Autonomous
Agents and Multiagent Systems.
[9] Bernhard von Stengel. Computation of Nash equilibria in finite games: introduction
to the symposium. Economic Theory, 42(1):1–7, 2010.
25
